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A powerful intuition behind much recent research is that a presupposition must be 
satisfied in its context of evaluation. The relevant notion of context is, in 
Stalnaker’s terminology (Stalnaker 1978), the ‘context set’, which encodes what 
the speech act participants take for granted (we will say ‘context’ for short). But 
the simplest version of this analysis faces immediate difficulties with complex 
sentences: John is incompetent and he knows that he is does not require that the 
speech act participants already take for granted that John is incompetent, since 
this proposition is asserted, not presupposed. The dynamic approach solves the 
problem by postulating that the second conjunct is evaluated with respect to a 
local context,  obtained by updating the global one with the content of the first 
conjunct; this explains why the presupposition of the second conjunct is in this 
case automatically satisfied. This analysis is captured by the dynamic rule stated 
in (1): the update of a context C with a conjunction is the successive update of C 
with each conjunct. 
(1) C[F and G] = C[F][G] 
 This rule has been interpreted in two ways. For Stalnaker (1974), it is not 
primitive but rather results from a pragmatic process of information exchange. 
The analysis was explanatory because it derived the rule from something more 
basic;  but it was not general: it did not easily extend to other connectives and 
operators. Heim’s dynamic semantics (Heim 1983) took the rule to be encoded 
lexically - which made it possible to extend the theory to other connectives and 
operators, but at the cost of explanatory depth (Heim 1990, 1992). In recent years, 
several new theories have sought to get out of this dilemma. We provide a brief 
survey of some of them, and try to explain how recent experimental data bear on 
this ‘new debate’ (important other theories are not discussed for lack of space, 
Thomason et al. 2006, Unger and van Eijck 2007, as well the exciting new 
analysis in Chemla 2008a; we also leave a discussion of the DRT approach of van 
der Sandt 1992 and Geurts 1999 for another occasion). 
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1.  The Problem 
 
Stalnaker took context update to result from  a process of belief revision: as soon 
as the addressee hears John is incompetent, and unless he objects, he changes his 
beliefs by accepting this proposition. This was taken to justify the update rule in 
(1). This approach has great initial force because the assertion of a conjunction 
can plausibly be equated with the successive assertion of each conjunct. But it 
doesn’t easily extend to other complex sentences, such as those in (2). 
(2) a. It didn’t rain or it has stopped raining (Presupposition: none) 
b. Each of my students has stopped smoking (Presupposition: each of my 
students used to smoke) 
c. None of my students have stopped smoking (Presupposition: each of my 
students used to smoke) 
The point of a disjunction is precisely that one can assert it without being 
committed to either disjunct; this makes it difficult to see how an assertion-based 
analysis can be applied to (2)a, despite the fact that there are non-trivial 
presuppositional facts to account for. In this case, it is the negation of the first 
disjunct that serves to justify the presupposition of the second one; this fact 
should presumably follow from a principled account of presupposition projection. 
When the presuppositional expression is predicative rather than propositional, as 
is the case in (2)b-c, things are equally difficult: the complex predicate has 
stopped smoking interacts with the quantifier so as to yield a presupposition that 
each of my students used to smoke. This fact can be derived by positing that the 
local context of has stopped smoking is student, which must entail the 
presupposition used to smoke - which gives the desired result when a generalized 
notion of entailment (among predicates) is adopted. But the difficulty is that a 
predicative element just isn’t the right kind of object to apply belief update to. 
More generally, it is unclear how Stalnaker’s pragmatic analysis can be applied at 
the sub-propositional level, as seems to be required here. No detailed account of 
these cases has been offered along Stalnakerian lines - and the difficulties to be 
overcome appear to be non-trivial. 
 Since Stalnaker’s pragmatic rationale appeared difficult to extend,  Heim 
1983 (following in part Karttunen 1974) gave a semantic version of the dynamic 
analysis, one in which the very meaning of words is dynamic from the start. The 
update rule in (1) is thus preserved, but it is taken to follow from the lexical 
meaning of and rather than from a procedure of belief update. The meaning of 
each word is thus re-analyzed in terms of context change potentials,  which are 
functions from contexts to contexts. It was initially thought that context change 
potentials could be predicted from truth-conditional properties alone, a claim that 
Heim later retracted (Heim 1992 fn. 9). For as was noted  in the 1980’s (e.g. 
Soames 1989), dynamic semantics is so powerful that it can stipulate in the lexical 
entry of any operator the way in which it transmits presuppositions. For this 
reason, the framework is insufficiently explanatory (Heim 1990): any classical 
operator can be given a variety of dynamic meanings which agree on non-
presuppositional sentences, but make conflicting predictions about 
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presuppositional ones; which shows that the dynamic framework fails to predict 
presupposition projection from truth-conditional content. For instance, dynamic 
semantics can define a ‘deviant’ conjunction  and*  as in (3):   
(3) C[F and* G] = (C[G])[F] 
In non-presuppositional examples, and* has the same effect as and: it returns the 
set of C-worlds that satisfy both F and G. But in examples such as John used to 
smoke and he has stopped,  (3) predicts that the sentence should result in a 
presupposition failure because C is first updated with the second conjunct before 
it is updated with the first one.  The difficulty is that dynamic semantics has no 
independent way of ruling out connectives such as and*; taken literally, the 
framework predicts that such a connective could exist in the world’s languages, 
which does not appear to be correct.  
 In the recent past, several theories have solved this problem in different - 
and conflicting - ways by meeting the following challenge: 
(4) Explanatory Challenge: Find an algorithm that predicts how any operator 
transmits presuppositions once its syntax and its classical semantics have 
been specified. 
These theories share two features: (a) they take as their input the classical 
semantic behavior of operators, i.e. their behavior with respect to expressions that 
contain no presuppositional (or anaphoric) material; (b) they account for 
presuppositional asymmetries that arise with semantically symmetric operators 
(such as conjunctions) by explicitly taking into account the linear order in which 
the arguments appear. But as is illustrated in (5), these theories differ conceptually 
along four dimensions: 1. their reliance on local contexts; 2. their use of 
trivalence;  3. their semantic or pragmatic nature; 4. the strength of the left-right 
bias they posit for presupposition projection. They also differ empirically: 
although they typically agree in the propositional case, they make conflicting 
predictions with respect to quantified examples. 
(5) Explanatory Theories 
 Transparency 
Theory 
Schlenker 
2007, 2008  
Local 
Contexts Re-
constructed 
Schlenker 
2009 
Constrained 
Dynamic 
Semantics 
Rothschild 
2008a, b, 
LaCasse 2008 
Trivalent 
Theories 
George 
2008a, b, 
Fox 2008  
Similarity: 
Presuppositions 
qua implicatures 
Chemla 2008b 
1. Local 
Contexts?  
No Yes Yes No No 
2. Trivalence? No No Yes Yes No 
3. Pragmatic? Yes Yes No Yes/No Yes 
4. Incremental 
/Symmetric? 
Yes Yes Yes/No Yes/No Yes 
 
Each line of the table starts with a question: (i) Does the theory posit local contexts? (ii) Does it rely on 
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trivalence? (iii) Is its account of projection pragmatic? (iv) Does it take left-right asymmetries to be a bias 
that can be overridden (= Yes), or to be a core property of presupposition projection (= No)?  Each column 
provides an answer; Yes/No indicates that different versions of a given theory provide different answers. 
 
 
2.  New Experimental Data 
 
The empirical side of the debate has been enriched, and constrained, by new 
experimental data due to Emmanuel Chemla (2007, to appear). Using an 
inferential paradigm (e.g. does sentence S ‘suggest’ inference I ?), Chemla 
confirmed the characterization of presuppositions in simple cases; for instance, 
presuppositions do indeed project out the scope of negation, as everyone thought. 
Similarly, a yes-no question inherits the presupposition of the corresponding 
assertion. But in other cases Chemla established data that were debated, or not 
discussed in the literature. Thus presupposition triggers that appear in the scope of 
quantifiers were taken by Heimian accounts to give rise to universal inferences: 
No student takes care of his computer was thought to presuppose that every 
student has a computer. By contrast, Beaver (1994, 2001) took the presupposition 
to be existential, and to lead just to an inference that at least one of these ten 
students has a computer. As for presupposition  triggers that appear in the 
restrictor of a quantifier, the data had barely been discussed in the literature, but 
Heimian accounts predicted a universal presupposition (No student who takes 
care of his computer will have problems was taken to presuppose that every 
student has a computer).   
 Chemla applied his inferential paradigm to French, and took great care to 
use highly explicit restrictors (e.g. none of these ten students, each of these ten 
students) so as to make it unlikely that an additional domain restriction is 
assumed, which would make the results difficult to interpret. The triggers he used 
were factive verbs, definite descriptions, and change of state verbs (on the other 
hand he did not use ‘anaphoric’ triggers such as too and again, a point to which 
we return at the end of this paper). He relied on two experimental methodologies: 
one was to ask subjects, in a binary task, whether they did or did not obtain a 
particular inference; another one was to ask them to evaluate the strength of the 
inference. Both methodologies established three major results. 
1. When a trigger appeared in a nuclear scope, the inference obtained depends on 
the particular quantifier which is used. Each of these ten students takes care of his 
computer and None of these ten students takes care of his computer both led to a 
strong inference that each of these ten students has a computer; but with other 
quantifiers (at least five, exactly five, less than five), subjects were at chance with 
respect to the universal inference. 
2. When a trigger appeared in the restrictor of a quantifier, patterns of universal 
projection were not found, or only in very weak form. 
These results are summarized in (6), which plots the robustness of universal 
inferences obtained depending on the quantifier and on the position (restrictor vs. 
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nuclear scope.   
(6) Chemla’s experimental results (from Chemla, to appear) 
 
Both results are a clear challenge to Heim’s theory. 
3. Comparing the trials in which a subject did compute a presupposition to those 
in which s/he failed to do so, Chemla showed that reaction times were slower in 
the latter case than in the former. In other words, failing to compute a 
presupposition appears to take time. This is the opposite of the result that has been 
found in the literature on scalar implicatures: subjects take less time when they 
fail to compute an implicature than when they do compute it. Such a result is 
consistent with the view that implicatures require a pragmatic reasoning which 
takes some time to compute (as opposed to entailments, which follow from the 
semantic meaning of sentences).  On the other hand, Chemla’s result about 
presuppositions is consistent with the commonly accepted view that 
presuppositions follow from the meaning of a sentence, and that a costly process - 
‘local accommodation’ - is necessary to ‘get rid’ of them. The new theories 
should eventually account for these data too. 
 We will briefly sketch the debate between four of the new theories: the 
Transparency theory (Schlenker, 2007, 2008a) and the reconstruction of local 
contexts developed in Schlenker (to appear) - which are conceptually very 
different but technically close; the trivalent theories of presupposition recently 
revived by George (2008a, b) and Fox (2008); and the constrained versions of 
dynamic semantics explored by Rothschild (2008a, b) and LaCasse (2008). 
(Chemla’s Similarity theory (2008), which is one of the most interesting 
developments in this domain, is harder to compare with the other theories and is 
not discussed in this survey). 
 
3.  The Transparency Theory 
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3.1.  Principles 
 
The Transparency theory purports to do without any notion of local context,  and 
to explicate presupposition projection in purely pragmatic terms, on the basis of 
two Gricean principles of manner. We start from a sentence S and a specification 
of its classical semantics, and of the presupposition triggers that appear in it. We 
adopt the convention of writing as dd’ a propositional or predicative expression 
that has a presupposition d (which we underline) and an assertive component d’. 
The analysis goes as follows. 
-A presupposition is viewed as a distinguished entailment, one that ‘wants’ to be 
articulated as a separate conjunct. So the semantics treats dd’ as if it were just the 
conjunction of d and d’. But the pragmatics specifies that in any syntactic 
environment, one should if possible say … (d and dd’)… rather than just … dd’…. 
All things being equal, then, one should say It is raining and John knows it rather 
than John knows that it is raining. The constraint that requires that 
presuppositions be articulated separately is called Be Articulate; it can be seen as 
a Gricean maxim of manner, since it imposes a condition on the way in which 
certain meanings should be expressed1. 
(7) Be Articulate 
Say a (d and dd’) b rather than a dd’ b. 
-A second principle of manner, Be Brief, limits the effects of Be Articulate. The 
intuition is that in any syntactic environment a_b, one should not say a (d and 
blah) b in case the words d and are certain to be eliminable without truth-
conditional loss. 
 The Transparency theory accounts for the presuppositional asymmetry 
obtained with semantically symmetric connectives (such as and) by taking Be 
Brief to come with a linear bias:  d and is considered idle in case no matter what 
follows, these words are certain to be eliminable given what is already assumed in 
the conversation. For instance, if it is already assumed that John is in Paris, it will 
be idle to start any sentence with John is in Paris and ... . Similarly, even if the 
context does not initially entail that John is in Paris, it will be idle to start a 
sentence with If John is staying near the Louvre, he is in Paris and ...: here too,  
the words in bold are certain to be eliminable without truth-conditional loss. 
Calling a ‘good final’ for a string s a string s’ that guarantees that s s’ is a well-
                                                
1 As Rothschild (2008b) points out, the ‘pragmatic prohibition’ against ‘using one short 
construction to express two independent meanings’  was explicitly discussed by Grice. 
Specifically, Grice (1981) proposed to add a new maxim of manner to account for 
presuppositions; its statement was very close to Be Articulate: ‘if your assertions are complex and 
conjunctive, and you are asserting a number of things at the same time, then it would be natural, 
on the assumption that any one of them might be challengeable, to set them out separately and so 
make it easy for anyone who wanted to challenge them to do so’ (Grice 1981).  See also Stalnaker 
1974 for a related idea. 
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formed sentence, we are led to the following statement of Be Brief - which we call 
‘incremental’ because it incorporates a left-right bias (information that comes 
before a presupposition trigger is taken into account, information that comes after 
isn’t). 
(8) Be Brief - Incremental Version 
Let C be a context set, and let d be an occurrence of an expression whose 
type ‘ends in t’ in a sentence a (d and d’) b.  
d  violates Be Brief  just in case for any expression g of the same type as d, 
for any good final b’,   C |= a (d and  g) b’ ! a g b’. 
Terminology: when d violates this principle, we say that it is (incrementally) 
transparent. 
 With these principles in place, a theory of presupposition projection can be 
developed by positing that Be Brief cannot be violated, while Be Articulate can 
be. This may be encoded by postulating (for instance in an optimality-theoretic 
framework) that Be Brief is more highly ranked than Be Articulate: 
(9) Be Brief >> Be Articulate 
Together, these principles predict that in any syntactic environment a 
presupposition trigger … dd’… must be expressed as …(d and dd’)…, unless d is 
in violation of Be Brief (which happens if case d is incrementally transparent). We 
call this the ‘principle of Transparency’ (or simply  ‘Transparency’); and to 
indicate that dd’ is acceptable in the string a dd’ b uttered in a context set C, we 
write Transp(C, dd’, a_b), with the following definition: 
(10) Transp(C, dd’, a_b) iff  for every expression g of the same type as d, for 
every good final b’,  C |= a (d and  g) b’ ! a g b’ 
Finally, we can say that formula F uttered in a context C is acceptable according 
to the Transparency theory just in case every occurrence of any presupposition 
trigger dd’ is acceptable: 
(11) Transp(C, F) iff  for every expression of the form dd’,  for all strings a, b, if F 
= a dd’ b, then Transp(C, dd’, a_b)  
3.2.  Fragment 
 
To illustrate the analysis, we apply it to a highly simplified language which is 
structurally disambiguated by the use of parentheses. We mostly restrict attention 
to simple sentences of the form p, (not F), (F and G), (F or G), (if F . G),  (No P . 
R), (Every P . P), and similarly for other quantifiers. The syntax of our fragment 
is defined in (12); it includes generalized quantifiers, which take two predicative 
arguments. As before, presupposition triggers are underlined; for instance, stop 
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smoking could be represented as a predicate PiPk with Pi   = used to smoke and Pk 
= doesn’t smoke (we come back to syntactic issues in Section 8). 
(12) Syntax 
a. Predicates: P ::= Pi | PiPk
2     
b. Propositions: p ::= pi | pipk    
c. Formulas   F ::=  p | (not F) | (F and F) | (F or F) | (if F. F) | (Every P . P) | 
(No P . P) | (Most P . P) | (Less than 5 P. P) | etc. 
 By contrast with Heim’s dynamic framework, our semantics is bivalent 
and classical. It is standard, except that expressions of the form PiPk and pipk are 
interpreted as the (predicative or propositional) conjunction of their two 
components. Since this semantics will be used in several of the analyses under 
discussion, it is worth spelling out in detail. For notational simplicity, we write as 
E the semantic value of an expression E; and we write as Ew the value of E 
evaluated in a world w. 
(13) Semantics 
We take as given a domain D of individuals and a domain W of possible 
worlds. 
a. The initial valuation I assigns to each elementary predicate Pi a value  Pi
w 
"  W and to each elementary proposition pi a value pi
w # {0, 1}. 
b. I is then extended to the entire language. For any world w of W, 
(pipk)
w = 1 iff  pi
w = pk
w = 1; (PiPk)
w = Pi
w $   Pk
w;   (not F)w = 1 iff Fw = 0;  (F 
and F’)w = 1 iff  Fw = F’w = 1;  (F or F’)w = 1 iff Fw = 1 or F’w = 1;  (if F . 
F’)w = 1 iff Fw = 0 or F’w = 1;  (Every P . P’)w = 1 iff every object d # D such 
that d # Pw satisfies d # P’w; (No P . P’)w = 1 iff no object d # D such that d 
# Pw satisfies d # P’w;  (Most P . P’)w = 1 iff more than half of the objects d 
# D such that d # Pw satisfy d # P’;  (Exactly 5 P . P’)w = 1 iff exactly 5 of 
the objects d # D such that d # Pw satisfy d # P’; etc. 
 
Notation: we will often write w |= F if the formula F is true in the world w; 
and we will write C |= F if the formula F is true in each of the worlds in the 
context set C. If C |= F ! G, we say that F and G are contextually 
equivalent. 
3.3.  Examples 
 
With this background in mind, we consider four examples, which we treat in 
some detail because they illustrate techniques that will  also be useful for the other 
accounts we will consider. In each case, we (a) specify the principle of 
Transparency, (b) state the result to be derived, and (c) prove it. In general, the 
                                                
2 To apply Be Articulate, we informally enrich (12)a with a rule of predicate conjunction [P ::=  
(Pi and Pk)], with the natural interpretation. The same extension is assumed throughout our 
discussion of trivalence in Section 5. 
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only non-trivial part consists in showing that if the principle of Transparency is 
satisfied, then the desired result holds. The fact that the principle is stated as a 
universal statement (“for every expression g of the same type as d, for every good 
final b’, ... “) is crucial: to show that the desired result holds, it is enough to find 
some expression g and some good final b’ that enforce the desired result - a 
technique which is used in each of the following examples. 
 Let us first consider the case in which a presupposition trigger appears in 
the first part of a conjunction (qq’ and p), for instance the sentence John knows 
that he is incompetent, and he is depressed. It is traditionally thought that this 
sentences presupposes q - i.e. John is incompetent. Transparency predicts that the 
sentence is acceptable just case an attempt to be articulate and thus to say ((q and 
qq’) and p) runs afoul of Be Brief because for any proposition g, for any good 
final b’, ((q and g) b’ is contextually equivalent to (g b’   (we use square brackets 
for legibility, but they are not part of the object language). 
(14)  (qq’ and p) presupposes p 
a. Transparency requires that for each clause g and for each good final b’, 
C |= [((q and g) b’] ! [(g b’] 
b. Claim: Transparency is satisfied ! C |= q 
c. Proof 
% : Suppose that Transparency is satisfied. In particular, taking g to be a 
tautology T and b’ to be the string  and and T), we have: 
C |= [((q and T) and T)] ! [(T and T)] 
It immediately follows that C |= q. 
 
& : Suppose that C |= q. Then for any propositional g,  C |= (q and g) ! g. 
So ((q and g) b’ is obtained from (g b’ by replacing the constituent g with a 
constituent  - namely (q and g) - which has the same truth conditions relative 
to C. Since our fragment is extensional, the two formulas are equivalent. 
As stated, the principle of Transparency only considers the part of a sentence that 
precedes the presupposition trigger; it is thus immediate that the same predictions 
are made for (qq’ or p) as for (qq’ and p) - which might explain why a 
presupposition that John is incompetent is obtained in the sentence John knows 
that he is incompetent, or he is depressed (we reconsider this point in Section 7, 
where non-incremental theories of presupposition projection are discussed). 
 Let us turn to the case in which the presupposition trigger appears in the 
second part of a conjunction. A standard result of Stalnaker’s and Heim’s 
analyses is that (p and qq’) presupposes (if p . q). For instance, John is 64 years 
old and he knows that he cannot be hired is predicted to presuppose that if John is 
64 years old, he cannot be hired. In this case, the incremental nature of the 
analysis will play no role: when one has seen (p and (d and g), where g is a 
constituent, one can tell that the only way to complete this string to obtain a well-
formed formula is to add to it the right parenthesis, yielding  (p and (d and g)); for 
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(d and g) is a constituent, and the only way it could have been put next to the first 
and is by an application of the syntactic rule for conjunctions, which 
automatically adds the right parenthesis too. The result is that quantification over 
good finals plays no role in this example - and the point generalizes to all other 
cases in which the presupposition trigger appears at the end of the sentence. This 
makes it straightforward to derive the desired result. 
(15)  (p and qq’) presupposes (if p . q) 
a. Transparency requires that for each propositional g and for each good final 
b’, C |= [(p and (q and g) b’] ! [(p and g b’] 
b. Claim: Transparency is satisfied ! C |= (if p . q) 
c. Proof 
% : Suppose that Transparency is satisfied. In particular, taking b’  to be the 
right parenthesis ) and g  to be a tautology T, we have: 
C |= (p and (q and T)) ! (p and T), hence C |= (p and q) ! p, 
and in particular 
C |=  p % q. But since we treat conditionals as material implications, this is 
just to say that C |= (if p. q). 
& : Suppose that C |= p % q. Then for each clause g, C |= (p and (q and g)) 
! (p and g).  Since the only value of b’ that makes it a good final is b’ = ), it 
also follows that for every good final b’,  
C |= [(p and (q and g) b’] ! [(p and g) b’] 
 Let us turn to conditionals. It can be shown that the case of (if pp’. q) is 
similar to (pp’ and q): the entire sentence is predicted to presuppose p. More 
interesting is the case in which the presupposition trigger is in the consequent of 
the conditional.  We do derive Heim’s result that (if p . qq’)  presupposes (if p . 
q); thus we predict a presupposition that If John is 64 years old, he cannot be 
hired for the sentence If John is 64 years old, he knows that he cannot be hired. 
The derivation of this result is given in (16); here too we use the fact that the only 
good final is the right parenthesis. 
(16) (if p .  qq’) presupposes (if p . q) 
 
a. Transparency requires that for each clause g and each good final b’, 
C |= [(if p . (q and g) b’] ! [(if p . g  b’] 
 
b. Claim: Transparency is satisfied ! C |= p % q 
 
c. Proof 
% : Suppose that Transparency is satisfied. In particular, taking b’ to be the 
right parenthesis ) and g  to be a tautology T, we have 
C |= (if p . (q and T)) ! (if p . T), hence 
C |= (if p . q) 
& : Suppose that C |= (if p . q). Then for each proposition g, C |= (if p . (q 
and g)) ! (if p. g), and thus for any good final b’,   C |= [(if p . (q and g) 
b’]! [(if p. g b’].  
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Since (p or qq’) has the same bivalent semantics as (if (not p) . qq’), and since p 
and qq’ appear in the same order in the two constructions, the Transparency 
theory also predicts that (p or qq’) should have the same presupposition as (if (not 
p) . qq’), namely (if p . q) (see Schlenker 2008s for discussion). Thus we have 
now explained why the negation of the first disjunct can justify the presupposition 
of the second. This derives on principled grounds the asymmetric dynamic 
disjunction which was posited in Beaver 2001. It is worth noting that all the 
explanatory accounts we survey here make exactly the same prediction in this 
respect. 
 Finally, let us consider a quantificational example. As noted, Each of my 
students has stopped smoking and None of my students have stopped smoking both 
presuppose that each of my students used to smoke. The universal inference 
obtained in the case of none is particularly important because it is characteristic of 
presuppositions - neither entailments nor scalar implicatures give rise to such a 
pattern (see Chemla, to appear a, for discussion and experimental data). Let us see 
how this result can be derived. 
(17) (No P .  QQ’) presuppoes (Every P . Q) 
 
a. Transparency requires that for each clause g and each good final b’, 
C |= [(No P . (Q and g) b’] ! [(No P . g  b’] 
 
b. Claim: Transparency is satisfied ! C |= (Every P. Q) 
 
c. Proof 
% :  Suppose that it is not the case that C |= (Every P. Q). Then for some 
world w and individual d, P(w)(d) = 1 but Q(w)(d) = 0. Take g to be a 
predicate D’ which is true of d and nothing else in w, and take b’ to be ). In 
such a case, w |=
 
(No P . (Q and D’)) because the only member of D’(w), 
namely d, does not belong to Q(w), so that the nuclear scope has an empty 
extension in w.  On the other hand, w |!
 
(No P. D’), because d belongs both 
to P(w) and to D’(w).   
& : Suppose that C |= (Every P. Q). By the Conservativiy of No, for any 
predicate g, C |= (No P . (Q and g)) ! (No P. g),  hence the result (since the 
only good final b’ is the right parenthesis). 
 
3.4.  General Results 
 
It was shown in Schlenker 2007 that in the propositional case the Transparency 
theory is fully equivalent to a version of Heim’s dynamic semantics (augmented 
with the asymmetric dynamic disjunction of Beaver 2001). In the quantificational 
case, the equivalence holds only if two additional assumptions are made: 
-Non-Triviality: quantificational clauses should not be ‘trivial’ (i.e. replaceable 
with a tautology or a contradiction). 
-Constancy: the domain is finite, and in addition restrictors should hold true of a 
constant number of individuals throughout the context set. 
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These assumptions are stated  precisely in Schlenker 2007, to appear (Appendix 
III). Let us just recapitulate the main conclusion, writing as C[F] the update of C 
with F in Heim’s framework3: 
(18) Under the assumptions of Non-Triviality and Constancy,  
a. C[F] ! # iff Transp(C, F).  
b. If C[F] ! #, C[F] = {w # C: w |= F} 
3.5.  Assessment 
 
The Transparency theory addresses the Explanatory Challenge defined at the 
beginning of our discussion (in (4)). But several reasonable criticisms have been 
leveled against it.  
1. First, it inherits some of the empirical deficiencies of Heim’s analysis. (i) When 
the assumptions of Non-Triviality and Constancy are met, the analysis predicts 
that universal inferences should systematically be obtained when a trigger is 
embedded in the nuclear scope of a generalized quantifier. But as we saw in 
Section 2, significant differences are in fact found among quantifiers; why this is 
so is unclear given the present analysis.  (ii)  Universal inferences are also 
predicted when a trigger appear in the restrictor of a quantifier; and here Chemla’s 
data suggest that the prediction is incorrect; we revisit this issue at the end of this 
article (we will see that universal  inferences are plausibly obtained, but with 
other triggers). 
2. Second, Be Articulate has been criticized either because (i) it lacks motivation 
(Beaver 2008, Krahmer 2008, van der Sandt 2008), or because (ii) it leads to 
undesirable predictions in case the articulated competition … (d and dd’)… is 
ungrammatical, or implausibly complicated (Beaver 2008). A discussion is found 
in Schlenker 2008b; let us sketch the main points.  
(i) First, there is arguably some independent motivation for Be Articulate; some 
cases of adjectival modification arguably lead to deviance because they violate Be 
Articulate: 
                                                
3 In Schlenker 2007, to appear, the following semantics is assumed for Heim’s analysis (the 
parts inside < > are optional; and Qi is a generalized quantifier whose semantics is given by the 
‘tree of numbers’ fi): 
C[p] = {w # C: pw = 1} 
C[pp'] = # iff for some w # C, pw = 0; if ! #, C[pp'] = {w # C: p'w = 1} 
C[(not F)] = # iff C[F] = #; if ! #, C[(not F)] = C - C[F] 
C[(F and G)] = # iff C[F] = # or (C[F] ! # and C[F][G] = #); if ! #, C[(F and G)] = C[F][G] 
C[(F or G)] = # iff C[F] = # or  (C[F] ! # and C[not F][G] = #);  if ! #, C[(F or G)] = C[F] ' 
C[not F][G] 
C[(if F. G)] = # iff C[F] = # or (C[F] ! # and C[F][G] = #); if ! #, C[(if F.G)] = C-C[F][not G] 
C[(Qi <P>P'.<R>R')] = # iff <for some w # C, for some d # D,  P
w(d) = 0> or <for some w # C, 
for some d # D, <Pw(d) = 1 and> P'w(d) = 1 and Rw(d) = 0>. If ! #, C[(Qi<P>P'.<R>R']) = {w # 
C: fi(a
w, bw) = 1} with aw = {d # D: P'w(d) = 1 and  R'w(d) = 0}, bw = {d # D: P'w(d) = 1 and  
R'
w(d) = 1} 
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(19) a. ? John is an autistic chemist. 
b. John is autistic, and he is a chemist. 
c. John is an autistic child4. 
In these cases, one presumably obtains deviance rather than a presupposition 
because if it were presupposed that, say, John is a chemist, one would save on 
words by saying John is autistic rather than John is an autistic chemist. The case 
of adverbial modification is minimally different because adverbs cannot be 
predicated of a DP in the absence of a verb; and there one can argue that 
weakened presuppositional effects are indeed found, for instance in None of these 
ten students came late (inference: each of these ten students came). These 
conclusions were confirmed with experimental means in Chemla (to appear b). 
(ii) Second, consider the case in which the ‘articulated’ competitor is 
ungrammatical, or too complex to utter. Beaver 2008 cites as an example of the 
first case ?Mary is thinner than there is a King of France and he is fat, which 
should be the ‘articulated’ version of Mary is thinner than the King of France is 
fat; since the former is ungrammatical, the latter should be acceptable without a 
presupposition, which does not seem to be the case5. The theory must be 
weakened to deal with these examples. There are two ways to do so. One is to 
stick to the principle of Transparency while abandoning the pragmatic principles 
that motivate it.  Another is to stick to the pragmatic principles, but to take them 
to be encapsulated. Specifically, we could posit that Be Articulate is a principle 
that does not have access to all rules of grammar, with the result that it treats 
some ungrammatical sentences as if they were acceptable.  There might well be 
similar cases of encapsulation in the domain of scalar implicatures: for me, There 
were delegates from New York at the meeting yields an inference that not all 
delegates from New York were at the meeting, despite the fact that the 
corresponding alternative is ungrammatical (all  - or for that matter most - is not 
an intersective quantifier, and thus one cannot say There were all delegates from 
                                                
4 Note that the semantic nature of the noun crucially matters, which suggests that the 
phenomenon does indeed have to do with the excessive richness of the meaning expressed. Here 
are two further examples from Schlenker 2006: 
 
(i)  a. ? John is a suicidal oncologist. 
 b. John is an oncologist and he is suicidal. 
 c. John is a suicidal student. 
 
(ii) a. ? John is a parricidal linguist. 
 b. John is a linguist. He is a parricide. 
 c. John is a parricidal adolescent. 
5 Yasutada Sudo (p.c.) independently raised a similar problem with respect to (i)b, which 
should be the articulated version of (i)a; he suggested a modification of Be Articulate to deal with 
the problem. 
(i) a. John met a man [who knows the king of France very well]. 
 b.  *John met a man [who there is a king of France and knows the king of France very 
well]. 
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New York at the meeting).  Whether this approach is promising will have to be 
determined in future research.   
 
4.  Reconstructing Local Contexts 
 
An alternative way to address the Explanatory Challenge is to preserve the notion 
of local contexts, but to provide a general algorithm that predicts their value on 
the basis of the syntax and the bivalent semantics of any sentence. Stalnaker 1974 
attempted to do precisely this, but we saw that a difficulty with his approach was 
that he equated local contexts with belief states - which made it difficult to 
account for presupposition projection at the sub-propositional level. A pragmatic 
reconstruction using different notions is attempted in Schlenker (2009, to appear). 
Conceptually, the theory is rather close to Stalnaker’s, and quite different from the 
Transparency theory; technically, however, it turns out to be very close to the 
latter - with the result that it makes almost the same predictions.    
 
4.1.  Motivating Local Contexts 
 
We take the local context of an expression S to be the minimal domain of objects 
that the interpreter needs to consider when he attempts to compute the meaning of 
a sentence. How can this notion of ‘minimal domain’ be motivated? The 
interpreter’s task is to determine which worlds of the context set are compatible 
with the speaker’s claim; in other words, he must compute a function from worlds 
in the context set to truth values. To do so, he has access to the context set C, and 
to the meaning of the words, which we take for simplicity to be functions of 
various types.  Now we will assume (i) that it is easier to perform the steps of the 
computation when part of the domain of a function can be disregarded, (ii) that 
the interpretation is performed incrementally (from left to right), and (iii) that 
before processing any expression, the interpreter tries to simplify his task as much 
as possible given what he already knows about the meaning of the sentence.  
From these assumptions, it follows that the interpreter will try to decide in 
advance of interpreting any expression S what is the smallest domain he needs to 
consider when he assesses the meaning of E; this ‘smallest domain’ is our notion 
of local context. 
  Let us make the intuition clear with an example. Suppose that we are in a 
context C, and that we have heard the speaker say: If John used to smoke, ... . 
Having computed the meaning of the antecedent, we set out to compute the 
meaning of the consequent S of this conditional, analyzed as before as a material 
implication. One strategy would be to retrieve a function that specifies the value 
of S in all possible worlds. But for the purposes of the conversation, only the 
worlds in C matter, because all other worlds are excluded by the shared 
assumptions of the conversation partners. So instead of computing the meaning of 
S, the interpreter may retrieve a function that uniformly assigns the value ‘false’ 
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to all worlds outside of C, and which assigns the value of S to those worlds that lie 
in C; this allows him to disregard part of the domain of the function when he 
computes the meaning of the expression. In effect, the interpreter may thus 
compute the value of (c’ and S) instead of the value of S, where c’ denotes C. We 
will say that this restriction to c’ is ‘innocuous’, because no matter what the value 
of S turns out to be, the restriction will not affect the truth conditions of the entire 
sentence.  Still, the interpreter can make his life even easier by further restricting 
attention to those C-worlds in which John smoked, because all worlds in which 
John never smoked will make the conditional true no matter what the value of S 
turns out to be; so if c’ denotes the set of p-worlds within C, c’ will still be an 
innocuous restriction.  We take the local context of S to be the strongest 
innocuous restriction, i.e. the one that entails all other innocuous restrictions.   
 
4.2.  Definitions 
 
Let us see more precisely how local contexts are computed. Since presupposition 
triggers are either of predicative or propositional type, we only need to determine 
the local context of propositional and predicative expressions. To do so, we enrich 
the object language with (i) context variables, which may be of propositional or 
predicative type (they will be written below as c’), and (ii) predicate conjunction, 
which receives the natural interpretation. If w is a world and F is a formula (which 
may contain the variable c’), we  write w |=c’( x F to indicate that w satisfies the 
formula F when c’ denotes x (as usual, we extend the notation to sets of worlds:  
C |=c’( x F means that every world in C satisfies F given this assignment 
function).  We say that a proposition x is stronger than a proposition x’ if x entails 
x’; and similarly if x and x’ are properties, with a generalized notion of 
entailment6. Our definition of local contexts can now be stated as follows:   
(20) The local context (written as lc(C, dd’, a_b)) of a propositional or predicative 
expression d that occurs in a syntactic environment a_b  in a context C is the 
strongest proposition or property x which guarantees that for any expression 
d’ of the same type as d,  for all strings b’ for which a d’ b’ is a well-formed 
sentence,  
 
C |=c’( x   a (c’ and d’) b’ ! a d’ b’ 
 
If no strongest proposition or property x with the desired characteristics 
exists,  lc(C, dd’, a_b) = #. 
Following the intuition we developed earlier, the local context of d in the sentence 
a d b is the strongest innocuous restriction that the interpreter can make in 
                                                
6 Writing as xw the value of a property x at w,  x entails a property x’ just in case for every 
possible world w and individual d, if d # xw, then d # x’w. 
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advance of interpreting  p when he processes the sentence from left to right. So at 
the point at which he computes this local context, he has access to the meaning of 
the expressions in the string a, but not to the meaning of p itself, nor of the 
expressions that come after p in the string b. Our procedure is incremental 
because it requires that the local context be an innocuous restriction no matter 
which expressions appear at the end of the sentence. This is the reason the rule in 
(20) requires that for every d’ and b’, a (c’ and d’) b’ should be equivalent to a d’ 
b’ relative to the context set. 
 With this notation in place, we can repeat the standard dynamic definition 
of presupposition satisfaction:  
(21) a. An elementary presuppositional expression dd’ is acceptable in a syntactic 
environment a_b in a context C (written as: Sat(C,  dd’,  a_b)) just in case d 
is entailed by the local context of dd’.  In other words: Sat(C,  dd’,  a_b) just 
in case  lc(C, dd’, a_b) entails d.  
 
b. A sentence F is acceptable in a context C just in case for every expression 
dd’, for all strings a, b, if F = a dd’ b, then Sat(C,  dd’,  a_b). 
 
4.3.  Examples 
 
To illustrate, let us compute the local context of S in the complex sentence John 
used to smoke and S. We ask once again what is the smallest domain of worlds 
that the interpreter may restrict attention to when he starts interpreting S. As 
before, he may exclude from  consideration all worlds that are not compatible 
with C. But now he can do more: any world w in which John never smoked will 
make the first conjunct false, and thus the value in w of the second conjunct will 
be immaterial to the conversation. Hence it won’t hurt to compute the meaning of 
c’ and S rather than S, where c’ denotes those C-worlds that satisfy the first 
conjunct. On the other hand, all of these worlds must be considered: if c’ 
excluded some world w of C in which John used to smoke,  it could turn out that 
S is true in w; by computing John used to smoke and (c’ and S) rather than John 
used to smoke and S, the interpreter would wrongly conclude that the sentence is 
false in w. The set of C-worlds that satisfy the first conjunct is thus the strongest 
innocuous restriction; in other words, it is the local context of the second 
conjunct. This correctly predicts that John used to smoke and he has stopped 
smoking does not presuppose anything: by construction, the local context of the 
second conjunct already entails its presupposition, and so no special demands are 
made on the global context C. 
 Since a general result guarantees equivalence with the Transparency 
theory (and thus with Heim’s dynamic semantics), we do not discuss further 
examples and turn instead to a derivation of the equivalence itself. 
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4.4. Equivalence with the Transparency Theory and with Dynamic Semantics 
 
Our reconstruction of local contexts does things in two steps: 
-it starts by defining the local context of an expression dd’ in an environment a_b 
as the strongest c’ for which c’ is transparent in a c’g b relative to the context set 
C. 
-it then requires that the value of c’ should entail d - which means that d is 
‘locally trivial’. 
The Transparency theory does essentially the same thing, but in a single step: 
given a sentence  a dd’ b, it simply asks whether d is (incrementally or 
symmetrically) transparent no matter what the assertive component d’ turns out to 
be. Because the theory is based on a competition between a dd’ b and its 
‘articulated’ competitor a (d and dd’)  b, the relevant notion of ‘transparency’ 
involves a full conjunction (i.e. we ask whether d and could be eliminated without 
truth-conditional loss), but the end result is still that the presupposition d must be 
‘locally trivialy’.    
 It can be shown that whenever the local context of dd’ exists, dd’ satisfies 
Transparency just in case d is entailed by its local context.  
(22)  Equivalence with Transparency  
For every formula that has the form a dd’ b, if lc(C, dd’, a_b) ! #, then 
Transp(C, dd’, a_b) iff Sat(C, dd’, a_b). 
The argument is straightforward.   
-First, suppose that  dd’ satisfies the principle of Transparency in the string a_b 
uttered in a context C (written as: Transp(C, dd’, a_b)). Then for every g of the 
same type as d and for every good final b’,  C |= a (d and g) b’ ! a g b’. But this 
also means that d is a transparent restriction for dd’ in a_b. Since the local context 
of dd’ (=  lc(C, dd’, a_b)) is the strongest transparent restriction (i.e. the one that 
entails all others), it immediately follows that  lc(C, dd’, a_b) entails d. 
-Second, suppose that lc(C, dd’, a_b) entails d. Since c’ denotes this local context, 
we have the following equivalences: 
(23) a. C |=
c’ (
  
lc(C, dd’, a_b)
 a (c’and g) b’ ! a g b’ 
b. C |=
c’ (
  
lc(C, dd’, a_b)
 a (c’and (d and g)) b’ ! a (d and g) b’ 
But since  lc(C, dd’, a_b) entails d,  replacing g with (d and g) in a (c’and g) b’ 
won’t affect the truth conditions: 
(24)  C |=
c’ (
  
lc(C, dd’, a_b)
 a (c’and (d and g)) b’ ! a (c’and g) b’    
Since the left-hand sides of  (23)b and (24) are identical, we obtain (25): 
(25)  C |=
c’ (
  
lc(C, dd’, a_b)
  a (c’and g) b’  !  a (d and g) b’ 
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And since the left-hand sides of (25) is identical to that of (23)a, we conclude in 
the end that C |=c’ ( lc(C, dd’, a_b) a (d and g) b’ ! a g b’. Since c’ does not occur 
in this formula, the value assigned to c’ is irrelevant and we obtain the result that      
C |= a (d and g) b’ ! a g b’, which shows that dd’ satisfies Transparency.  
 More generally, it follows that an entire formula F satisfies Transparency  
just in case each presupposition is entailed by its (incremental or symmetric) local 
context. Through the (limited) equivalence between the Transparency theory and 
Heim’s dynamic semantics, we also obtain in this way a limited equivalence 
between the latter and our reconstruction of local contexts.  
 
4.5.  Local Contexts vs. Transparency  
 
The equivalence isn’t quite complete because there are cases in which local 
contexts fail to exist; in such cases, a refinement of the theory is needed to 
account for presupposition projection - and the refinement in question yields full 
equivalence with the Transparency theory (for details, see Schlenker, to appear, 
Appendices I and III).  Modulo this remark, all empirical advantages and flaws of 
the Transparency theory are inherited by our reconstruction of local contexts.  
 This is not to say that there is no difference between the two theories. 
1. Since our reconstruction of local contexts does not rely on Be Articulate, it is 
immune to the objections that were leveled against the latter, namely that (a) it is 
insufficiently motivated, and (b) it makes incorrect predictions in case the 
‘articulated’ competitor is ungrammatical or too complicated to express. 
2. Unlike the Transparency theory, an analysis based on local contexts makes it 
possible to develop a general theory of triviality. We may call ‘local meaning’ of 
E the intersection of E with the local context of E. An expression E is locally 
trivial if the local meaning of E is indistinguishable from that of a tautology or of 
a contradiction - which is to say that E or (not E) is entailed by its local context 
(Stalnaker 1978). This immediately accounts for the pragmatic oddness of the 
examples in (26): in each case, the expression in bold is either entailed by its local 
context, or contradictory with it. 
(26) a. ? John has cancer and he is sick. 
b. ? John is sick or he has cancer. 
c. ? No student is a student and proud of it. 
Given his analysis of conjunctions, Stalnaker could account for the oddness of 
(26)a, since he is sick is entailed by its local context. But for lack of a general 
theory of local contexts, (26)b-c weren’t explained. They are in the present 
framework: in (26)b, he has cancer is contradictory in its local context, which 
entails the negation of John is sick. In (26)c, a student is entailed by its local 
context. This analysis could in principle pave the way for a more general theory 
of triviality. 
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3. Last, but not least, the two theories are likely to make different predictions 
about psycholinguistic data. As was noted in Section 2, Chemla’s experiments 
suggest that subjects who fail to compute a presupposition take more time than 
those who compute one. This is the opposite from the result typically found about 
scalar implicatures: a subject who fails to compute a scalar implicature takes less 
time than one who does compute it. These results have different consequences for 
the two theories. 
-For the Transparency theory, presuppositions are implicatures of manner. So 
these data might be problematic: the failure to compute a presupposition should 
have the same effect on reaction times as the failure to compute an implicature. 
As a first approximation, then, Chemla’s data go against the Transparency theory. 
But in fact the situation is more subtle: the Transparency theory does not claim 
that presuppositions are scalar implicatures, but rather implicatures of manner. So 
the question is how the latter affect reaction times: do subjects who fail to 
compute an implicature of manner take more or less time than those who do 
compute it? This will have to established in future research. 
-On the other hand, our reconstruction of local contexts is in the same situation as 
dynamic semantics with respect to Chemla’s data. It can claim that the normal 
course of events is for a presupposition to be entailed by its local context; if this is 
not the case, the presupposition must be cancelled in some way. In Heim’s theory,  
this is done through the mechanism of local accommodation, which is presumably 
costly; the same general line could be adopted here. 
 
5.  Trivalent theories 
 
5.1.  Motivating Trivalent theories 
 
Trivalent analyses of presupposition projection have recently undergone a revival 
thanks to the works of  George 2008a, b and Fox 2008, who follow insights of 
Peters 1979 and Beaver and Krahmer 2001. Their starting point is a directed 
version of two trivalent logics, Strong Kleene and Supervaluations. These systems 
are designed to treat a semantic failure as a kind of uncertainty about the value of 
an expression: roughly, the idea is that if pp’ is uttered while p is false, we just 
cannot determine whether the clause is true or false - although we know it has a 
classical value. The semantic module outputs the value # in case this uncertainty 
cannot be resolved - which systematically happens with unembedded atomic 
propositions whose presupposition is not met. But in some complex formulas it 
may happen that  no matter how the value of pp’ is resolved (i.e. as true or false), 
one will be in a position to determine unambiguously the value of the entire 
sentence. Consider for instance the sentence (p and qq’) in a situation in which p 
is false and q is false too. qq’ receives the indeterminate value #, but no matter 
how the indeterminacy is resolved, the entire sentence will be false. Now we can 
make this same reasoning with respect to every world in the context set: for any 
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world w, the sentence will have a determinate truth value just in case either (i) p is 
false at w (so that it doesn’t matter how one resolves the indeterminacy of the 
second conjunct); or (ii) p is true, in which case the presupposition q of the second 
conjunct is satisfied. Since we are solely interested in worlds that are compatible 
with what the speech act participants take for granted, we derive the familiar 
prediction that the context set must guarantee that if p, q; this is the condition that 
must be satisfied if (p and qq’) is to have a determinate truth value in every world 
of the context set. The intuition that drives this analysis is completely general: by 
treating presupposition failure as a kind of  ‘uncertainty’ between true and false, it 
provides a general recipe for determining under what conditions the uncertainty in 
question does or does not matter for the entire sentence. This allows these 
trivalent accounts to the Explanatory Challenge that was stated at the outset. 
 The trivalent analysis comes in several varieties, depending on whether 
the semantics is taken to be compositional or not. In the first case, we obtain a 
directional version of the Strong Kleene logic, one first explored by Peters 1979, 
and greatly developed by George 2008a, b; in the second case, we naturally obtain 
a directional version of a supervaluationist semantics (Fox 2008). Roughly 
speaking, supervaluations treat the semantic uncertainty triggered by an 
expression pp’ type by type, in the sense that different occurrences of pp’ in a 
given sentence must be ‘resolved’ in the same way. As a result, all classical 
tautologies are also supervaluationist tautologies; for instance, even if p is false 
and thus pp’ is indeterminate, (pp’ or (not pp’)) is evaluated as true, because  
when we resolve the uncertainty in the same way for both tokens of pp’ , we end 
up with a true statement. By contrast, Strong Kleene treats the semantic 
uncertainty token by token, with the result that (pp’ or (not pp’)) gets the value # 
when pp’ is indeterminate. For simplicity, we will discuss the Supervaluationist 
approach discussed in Fox 20087. 
 
 
 
 
5.2. Definitions    
 
5.2.1.  Supervaluations 
   
                                                
7 The strategy we will adopt to make the Supervaluationist framework incremental is as close 
as possible to the one we used in the Transparency theory and in our reconstruction of local 
contexts. On the other hand, there are several ways to make a Strong Kleene directional. George 
2008a, b bases his analysis on the linear order in which the arguments of a functor appear  (he 
follows in this respect the intuitions of Peters 1979 and Beaver and Krahmer 2001). An alternative 
would be to start from the Strong Kleene logic, and to adopt the strategy we develop for the 
supervaluationist semantics, which is to quantify over good finals and to require that no matter 
how a sentence ends it should have a value different from #. 
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Following the Supervaluationist framework, we start from a trivalent valuation, 
which assigns partial functions to expressions of propositional and predicative 
type; to obtain a definition of truth and falsity for the entire language, we will 
consider certain complete (bivalent) extensions of these partial functions. In order 
to apply this analysis to the fragment we have been using throughout, the trivalent 
valuation must treat symbols of the form pp’ and PP’ as atomic - but we will 
specify its semantics in such a way that p is in fact the presupposition of pp’: the 
latter will get the indeterminate value # in a world w whenever p is false in w (and 
similarly for predicates of the form PP’, evaluated with respect to a world and an 
individual). To be more precise, we define in (27) our trivalent valuation i on the 
basis of the bivalent valuation I we used earlier: 
(27) Trivalent valuations 
For all symbols of the form p, p’, P, P’, for all worlds w in W and objects d 
in D, 
a. i(p)(w) = I(p)(w), i(p’)(w) = I(p’)(w) 
b. i(P)(w)(d) = I(P)(w)(d), I(p’)(w)(d) = I(P’)(w)(d) 
c. i(pp’)(w) = 1 iff I(p)(w) = I(p’)(w) = 1;  i(pp’)(w) = 0 iff I(p)(w) = 1 and 
I(p’)(w) = 0; i(pp’)(w) = # otherwise. 
d. i(PP’)(w)(d) = 1 iff I(P)(w)(d) = I(P’)(w)(d) = 1;  i(PP’)(w)(d) = 0 iff 
I(P)(w)(d) = 1 and I(P’)(w)(d) = 0; i(PP’)(w)(d) = # otherwise. 
  Since the analysis crucially relies on the bivalent extensions of a trivalent 
valuation, we must define this notion. The intuition is that a bivalent extension i’ 
of a trivalent valuation i is obtained by considering all possible resolutions of the 
indeterminate value # as 0 or as 1, while ‘keeping’ the classical values that i 
assigns. This leads to the following definition: 
(28) Extensions of a trivalent valuation 
i’ is a bivalent extension of i just in case for every proposition p of type <s, 
t>, for every predicate P of type <s, <e, t>>, for every world w and for every 
individual of type d: 
if [i(p)](w) ! #, [i’(p)](w) = [i(p)](w); otherwise, [i’(p)](w) # {0, 1} 
if [i(P)](w)(d) ! #, [i’(P)](d) = [i(P)](d); otherwise, [i’(P)](d) # {0, 1} 
Using the bivalent extensions of a trivalent valuation i, we can finally extend the 
latter to a trivalent interpretation I* for the entire language:  
(29) Extension to the entire language of a trivalent valuation 
Let F be a formula, interpreted with respect with respect to a trivalent 
valuation i. Then i is extended to an interpretation I* for the entire language 
by using the following rules, together with a classical semantics to extend the 
bivalent valuations i’ to the entire language. For every world w,  
 
[I*(F)](w) = 1 iff for every bivalent extension i’ of i, [i’(F)](w) = 1 
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[I*(F)](w) = 0 iff for every bivalent extension  i’ of i, [i’(F)](w) = 0 
[I*(F)](w) = # otherwise. 
A sentence F can then be said to be presuppositionally acceptable with respect to 
a context set C just in case for every world w in C, [I*(F)](w) ! #. In other words,  
C should guarantee that F has a classical value. This leads us to the following 
definition of ‘acceptability’, which we call ‘symmetric’ because it does not (yet) 
incorporate a left-right bias: 
(30) Symmetric Acceptability 
A sentence F uttered in a context C is symmetrically acceptable if and only if 
for every world w of C, [I*(F)](w) ! # 
 
5.2.2. Incrementalization   
 
At this point, nothing in this trivalent analysis accounts for the difference between 
the presuppositional behavior of, say, (p and qq’) and (qq’ and p): in 
supervaluations as in classical logic - or for that matter in Strong Kleene logic - a 
conjunction is semantically symmetric. Peters 1979 and George 2008a, b made 
the Strong Kleene rules asymmetric. Peters just stipulated certain rules, but 
George gave a general recipe for obtaining ‘incremental’ versions of Strong 
Kleene operators given a specification of their classical semantics, and the 
syntactic order in which they take their arguments; this allowed him to fully 
address the Explanatory Challenge. In the Supervaluationist framework, we can 
use exactly the same procedure of incrementalization as we did in the 
Transparency theory: for a trigger dd’ to be acceptable in an environment a_b, 
one should be certain that it will not trigger a failure no matter how the sentence 
ends. In other words, we should ascertain that for every good final b’, the 
sentence a dd’ b’ will be acceptable: 
(31) Incremental Acceptability 
F uttered in C is incrementally acceptable just in case for all strings a, b, 
and for expressions dd’, if F = a dd’ b, then for every good final b’ 
which contains no underlined material, a dd’ b’ is presuppositionally 
acceptable, i.e. for every world w of C, [I*(a dd’ b’)](w) ! #. 
 
It should be noted that the incrementalization strategy adopted here is somewhat 
counterintuitive. As in earlier accounts, the idea is that when we process  dd’ we 
should check that no matter how the sentence ends the result should be 
presuppositionally acceptable; but crucially we consider good finals that do not 
contain any presuppositional material, as is indicated in bold in (31). If we 
considered all possible good finals, most sentences that are intuitively acceptable 
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would be predicted to be deviant; for instance, (pp’ and q) would typically not be 
acceptable even if the context set entails p, because when one checks (pp’ one 
would have to consider a sentence such as (pp’ and rr’) - whose presupposition 
would fail to be satisfied if C doesn’t guarantee that if p’, r. This explains the 
restriction to good finals that only include bivalent (i.e. non-underlined) material  
in (31). 
 
5.3. Examples 
 
To illustrate the theory, we will consider two examples in detail:  (if p . qq’) and 
(No P. QQ’) (we informally discussed (p and qq’) when we motivated the 
trivalent approach above; we will informally discuss numerical quantifiers 
below).  Since in each case the presupposition trigger is at the end, we do not need 
to worry about the incremental component of the analysis (this is because at the 
point at which the presupposition trigger is processed, the only good final will 
always be the right parenthesis).  
(32) (if p . qq’) 
 
a. Claim:  This sentence is incrementally acceptable ! C |= (if p . q) 
 
b. Proof:  
% : Suppose that the sentence is incrementally acceptable. For every 
good final b’, it should be the case that for every world w of C, I*((if p . 
qq’ b’)(w) ! #; since b’ can only be )8, this is equivalent to:  I*((if p . qq’ 
))(w) ! #. Now assume, for contradiction, that w # C, i(p)(w) = 1 and 
i(q) = 0. It follows that i(qq’)(w) = #. Now we can find two bivalent 
extensions i’ and i” of i which satisfy i(p)(w) = i’(p)(w) = i”(p)(w),  
i’(qq’)(w) = 1 and i”(qq’)(w) = 0. It is clear that i’(if p . qq’)(w) = 1, 
while i”(if p . qq’)(w) = 0. Since these two extensions of i disagree, I*(if 
p . qq’)(w) = #. 
 
& : Suppose that C |= (if p . q). Then for every world w in C, if i(qq’)(w) 
= #, i.e. if i(q)(w) = 0, it must be that i(p)(w) = 0; and it follows that for 
every bivalent extension i’ of i, either i’(qq’)(w) ! # (hence i’((if p . 
qq’))(w) ! #) or or  i’(p)(w) = 0 (hence  i’((if p . qq’))(w) = 1). Either 
way, i’((if p . qq’))(w) ! #. Since the only good final for  (if p . qq’ is ), it 
follows that I*(if p . q) ! #.   
 
 In our next example, it will be useful to remember that a sentence F  is 
presuppositionally acceptable just in case for every world w of the context C, F 
has the value true or the value false in w. 
                                                
8 More precisely: if could only have been introduced by the rule for (if F. F) in (12)c; and 
since p and q are formulas, it must be that b = ). 
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(33) (No P . QQ’) 
a. Claim:  This sentence is incrementally acceptable ! C |= (Every P . (Q 
and (not Q’))) or (Some P . (Q and Q’)).   
b. Proof:  
 % : If the sentence is presuppositionally acceptable, then for every world w 
of C, I*(F)(w) = 1 or I*(F)(w) = 0.  
-Suppose that I*(F)(w) = 1. We show that w |=  (Every P . (Q and (not 
Q’))). Assume, for contradition, that for some d in D, i(P)(w)(d) = 1, and 
i(Q)(w)(d) = 0 or i(Q’)(w)(d) = 1.  
(a) If  i(Q)(w)(d) = 0, i(QQ’)(w)(d) = #, and thus for some bivalent extension 
i’ of i, i(QQ’)(w)(d) = 0, which refutes I*(F)(w) = 1, contra hypothesis.  
(b) If  i(Q)(w)(d) = 1 and i(Q’)(w)(d) = 1, i(QQ’)(w)(d) =  1, and for every 
bivalent extension i’ of i, i’(QQ’)(w)(d) = 1, which refutes I*(F)(w) = 1, 
contra hypothesis. 
- Suppose that I*(F)(w) = 0. We show that w |= (Some P . (Q and Q’)). 
Assume, for contradiction, that for every d in D for which i(P)(w)(d) = 1,  
i(Q)(w)(d) = 0 or i(Q’) = 0. So we can find a bivalent extension i’ of i that 
guarantees that, for every d for which i(P)(w)(d) = 1, i’(QQ’)(w)(d) = 0 [if 
i(Q)(w)(d) = 0,  i’(QQ’)(w)(d) = 0 is a possible value because i(QQ’)(w)(d) = 
#; if i(Q)(w)(d) = 0 and i(Q’) = 0, i’(QQ’)(w)(d) = 0 is a possible value 
because i(QQ’)(w)(d) = 0]. It is then clear that i’((No P . QQ’)) = 1.  But this 
refutes the claim that  I*(F)(w) = 0, contra hypothesis. 
 
& : Suppose that C |= (Every P . (Q and (not Q’))) or (Some P . (Q and Q’)). 
Consider any word w of C. 
-Supose that w |=  (Every P . (Q and (not Q’))). It follows that for every d for 
which i(P)(w)(d) = 1, i(QQ’) = 0 - and the same result holds for all extensions 
i’ of i, hence I*(F) = 1.  
-Suppose that w |=  (Some P . (Q and Q’)), and let d be such that i(P)(w)(d) = 
1, i(Q)(w)(d) = i(Q’)(w)(d) = 1. It follows that i(QQ’)(w)(d) = 1, and this 
holds for all bivalent extensions i’ of i as well, hence I*(F) = 0. 
 It is clear, then, that (No P . QQ’) does not presuppose that (Every P . Q); 
what is presupposed is quite a bit weaker, which might seem to go against 
Chemla’s experimental results. However these results only provide information 
about the inferences one can draw from various statements. And even though 
(Every P . Q) is not a presupposition of  (No P . QQ’), it is an entailment of it, in 
the sense that if (No P . QQ’) is true, so is (Every P . Q). This fact follows from 
the part in bold in (33)b. The result is rather intuitive: if in some C-world w some 
P-individual d failed to satisfy the presupposition Q of the main predicate,  there 
would be uncertainty as to the value that QQ’ takes in w with respect to d - which 
means that we couldn’t be certain that no P-individual satisfies QQ’ (since d is a 
potential counterexample).   We come back  below to further tests that will 
determine whether the universal inference Chemla found with (No P . QQ’) is an 
entailment or a presupposition. 
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 Be that as it may, trivalent accounts have a field day when it comes to 
some numerical quantifiers. Consider for instance sentences of the form (At least 
five P . QQ’) and (Less than five P . QQ’).  Chemla showed experimentally that 
these do not trigger an inference that every P-individual is a Q-individual. 
Trivalent accounts can derive this result. To make things concrete, suppose that 
there are ten P-individuals, and suppose further that in w at least five P-
individuals satisfy both Q and Q’, while all other P-individuals fail to satisfy Q - 
with the result that the value that QQ’ takes with respect to these other individuals 
in w is uncertain. Despite this uncertainty,  it can be determined that (At least five 
P . QQ’) is true and that (Less than five P . QQ’) is false. So from the assumption 
that sentence has a classical truth value, it certainly does not follow that every P-
individual is a Q-individual; in other words, we correctly predict that the universal 
inference should fail to hold.  
 Still, this analysis comes at a cost: the sentence  (Exactly five P . QQ’) is 
predicted to entail that every P-individual is a Q-individual, contrary to Chemla’s 
findings. To see this, suppose for contradiction  that in w (Exactly five P . QQ’) is 
true while some P-individual d fails to satisfy Q (which means that i(QQ’)(w)(d) 
= #). Consider any extension  i’ of i which assigns the value true to (Exactly five 
P . QQ’), and suppose for concreteness that i’(QQ’)(w)(d) = 1 (the case 
i’(QQ’)(w)(d) = 0 is similar). Since i(QQ’)(w)(d) = #, there is a bivalent extension 
i” of i which is identical to i’ except that i”(QQ’)(w)(d) = 0. But then i” cannot 
assign the value true to (Exactly five P . QQ’): this ‘exactly’ claim is sensitive to 
the precise number of P-individuals that satisfy QQ’, and thus a difference of one 
will necessary matter. So it couldn’t be that all bivalent extensions of i yield the 
same result, contrary to hypothesis.   
 
5.4. Comparisons and Assessment 
 
In all the cases we considered, the Trivalent account predicts presuppositions that 
are never stronger than those of the Transparency theory or of our reconstruction 
of Local Contexts. Given the fragment we used throughout, some general results 
can be stated: 
(34) Comparisons 
Consider the fragment defined in (12). 
a. With respect to its propositional part, the Trivalent theory under 
consideration predicts the same presuppositions as the theories we considered 
earlier (Heim’s dynamic semantics, Transparency theory, reconstruction of 
local contexts). 
b. In general, the Trivalent theory predicts presuppositions that are equivalent 
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or weaker than the presuppositions predicted by the theories we considered 
earlier9 (and it predicts different entailments). 
In quantificational examples, the theories we considered earlier all predict - when 
some technical assumptions are satisfied - that we should obtain universal 
presuppositions. Things are different in the Trivalent theory: as we saw, for (No P 
. QQ’), (At least five P . QQ’), (Less than five P . QQ’), no universal inferences 
are predicted. 
 How should we evaluate these results? 
-With respect to at least five and less than five, the trivalent account makes better 
predictions than the alternatives we considered earlier. 
-With respect to exactly five, it predicts in most cases a universal inference, which 
does not seem to be right given Chemla’s result. But the alternative accounts we 
considered earlier also predict a universal inference. 
-With respect to sentences of the form (No P . QQ’), all accounts under 
consideration predict universal inferences, but with a different status: for the 
accounts we considered earlier, the inference is presuppositional: the universal 
inference is predicted to be satisfied by each world of the context set; for the 
Trivalent theory, the inference is an entailment: it is predicted to be satisfied by 
each world compatible with what the speaker believes. 
 There is a simple way to distinguish between the theories under 
consideration, however. When (No P . QQ’) appears in a question, 
presuppositional inferences should be projected but entailments should not be. 
Without going into formal details (which depend on one’s theory of questions), 
the idea is that when a question ? F is asked one can assume that F has a classical 
truth value, but not that F is true (as this would make the question  trivial). So we 
can ask whether the universal inference is in fact preserved in questions: 
(35) a. Did none of these ten students stop smoking?  
b. Is it true that none of these ten students have stopped smoking? 
I believe that the universal inference is in fact preserved, which would be an 
argument against the trivalent analysis - though this will have to be established 
more carefully in future research (see Schlenker 2009 for a more detailed 
discussion of presupposition projection in questions, developed within Krifka’s 
‘structured meanings’ framework). 
 I should point out that Ben George has elegantly addressed this problem 
within his own trivalent system (George 2008a), which is far more subtle than the 
one surveyed here. The basic idea is to add to the trivalent analysis a built-in bias 
for truth, which specifies that the sentence (No P . QQ’) is (incrementally) ruled 
out as deviant if the presupposition alone suffices to exclude the possibility that 
                                                
9 These results follow from the formal analysis developed in the Appendix of the initial 
version of my paper on “Local Contexts”, available online at http://homepages.nyu.edu/~pds4/.  
680 Philippe Schlenker
the sentence will end up true. If at some world w of the context set, some element 
d satisfies P but not Q, we can be certain that the sentence won’t be true at w: d 
will make  QQ’ indeterminate, which in turn means that the quantified statement 
may be indeterminate or false, but certainly not true. Importantly, for quantifiers 
that are not universal in force, some weaker presuppositions are sometimes 
obtained - arguably an important virtue when one considers Chemla’s recent 
experimental results.   
 With respect to the reaction times analyzed by Chemla, the Trivalent 
account is potentially at an advantage over the Transparency theory. The latter 
takes presuppositions to be implicatures of manner, which makes it mysterious 
why subjects take less time when they fail to compute an implicature that when 
they do compute it (as was mentioned before, precisely the opposite result holds 
of scalar implicatures). Since the trivalent analysis takes presuppositions to be a 
core semantic property of lexical items, it is not particularly surprising that some 
costly process should be needed to ‘get rid’ of them, i.e. to somehow turn them 
into part of the assertive component. How this process happens is left open - but 
since alternative accounts also need a stipulation, this is not an argument against 
the trivalent analysis. 
 Finally, I note that on a conceptual level the incrementalization strategy 
adopted within the Trivalent analysis has a weird twist: although the semantics is 
trivalent, when we quantify over good finals to obtain an incremental projection 
algorithm we only consider good finals that contain no presupposition triggers. 
Why this is so is a bit mysterious. 
 
6.  Constrained Dynamic Semantics 
 
Going full circle, one could try to address the Explanatory Challenge within 
dynamic semantics itself. Two recent accounts introduce constraints  on possible 
dynamic operators so as to solve the problem of overgeneration that was found in 
Heim’s theory.  This program was developed independently, and in rather 
different forms, by N. LaCasse and D. Rothschild; we focus on the latter.  But in 
order to see what is characteristic of this attempt, we start by adapting our 
reconstruction of local contexts to a framework which is truly dynamic and yet 
solves the explanatory problem. 
 
6.1. A solution based on our reconstruction of local contexts 
 
Our reconstruction of local contexts is non-dynamic, in the sense that it analyzes 
the meaning of sentences in terms of truth conditions rather than in terms of 
context change potentials. Still, one can use it to constrain a more conservative 
version of dynamic semantics, one in which all expressions are intrinsically 
dynamic. We can thus require that for any unary connective *, lexical rules 
specify that the presupposition of FF’ in C[*FF’] should be checked with respect 
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to the incremental context of FF’; and in case no presupposition failure occurs, 
the update of C with (*FF’)  is simply the subset of worlds of C that satisfy (* F’) 
(given that in such a case F  is entailed by the incremental context, this is the 
same thing as satisfying (*FF’)).  
(36) C [(* FF’)] = # iff  lc(C, FF’, *_) " F.  If ! #, C[(* FF’)] = {w#C: w |= (* 
F’)}    
The same reasoning can be applied to binary connectives: C[(FF’ * GG’)] is 
defined just in case the local context of FF’ entails F and the local context of GG’ 
entails G. When no failure arises, C[(FF’ * GG’)] is just the set of C-worlds that 
satisfy F’ * G’. 
(37) C[(FF’ * GG’)] = # iff (it is not the case that lc(C, FF’, (_ * GG’))  " F) or 
(lc(C, FF’, (_  * GG’)) " F   and (it is not the case that lc(C, GG’,  (FF’ * 
_))  " G)). If ! #, C[(FF’ * GG’)] = {w#C: w |= (F’ * G’)}.  
To illustrate, for * = and,  C[(FF’ and GG’)] = # iff the local context of FF’, 
namely C itself, fails to entail F, or if the local context of GG’, namely C ) FF’, 
fails to entail G. If  C[(FF’ and GG’)] ! #, it is equal to the set of worlds in C 
which satisfy F’ and G’. This is exactly the dynamic rule posited in Heim 1983. 
More generally, our templates derive Heim’s results in the propositional case  
(augmented with the asymmetric dynamic disjunction of Beaver 2001). The 
template in (37) can easily be extended to binary connectives that have a different 
syntax, such as (if F . G) or (Q F . G). 
 Proponents of dynamic semantics may adopt this implementation of our 
reconstruction of local contexts. But since in the cases we considered the same 
results can be obtained within a non-dynamic semantics, it would seem that 
additional arguments (maybe from other domains, such as anaphora) would be 
needed to justify the adoption of a dynamic framework. 
 
6.2. Rothschild’s analysis 
 
6.2.1. Motivations 
An alternative, laid out in Rothschild 2008a, b, is to develop in greater detail the 
original intuition of Heim’s dynamic semantics, but with a general procedure to 
‘dynamicize’ the classical semantics of any connective or operator. The 
incremental version of Rothschild’s analysis has three components. 
 
1. First, he sets up a formal language in which all Context Change Potentials can 
be rigorously defined. One can think of it as a meta-language  interpreted 
according to a variant of the Weak Kleene logic: whenever an expression is 
semantically undefined, so is the sentence it occurs in. This was arguably the tacit 
assumption made by Heim 1983 when she wrote definitions such as (38) (copied 
with a slightly updated notation): 
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(38) C[not S] = C - C[S] 
The idea was that as soon as any component of  C - C[S] is semantically 
undefined, so is the entire expression; this lead to the desirable result that the 
presuppositions of S are inherited by not S. Rothschild adopts the same idea, but 
his language is propositional rather than set-theoretic. So for him the definition in 
(38) would be written as in (39), interpreted with a Weak Kleene logic. 
(39) C[not S] = C and not C[S] 
 
2. Second, Rothschild makes explicit what it means for such a definition to 
‘correspond’ to the semantics of a classical connective. He does so by requiring 
that in the bivalent case (i.e. when the arguments of the connective do not include 
presupposition triggers), the right truth conditions are obtained - an idea we also 
used above when we ‘dynamicized’ our reconstruction of local contexts: when F 
and G are non-presuppositional, C [(*F)] should be the set of C-worlds that satisfy 
the classical meaning of *F, and  C[(F * G)]  should be the set of C-worlds that 
satisfy the classical meaning of (F * G). This still yields many possible dynamic 
extensions for any classical connective. 
 
3. Third, Rothschild applies a procedure of ‘incrementalization’ that rules out all 
but one of these dynamic extensions - which suffices to derive precisely Heim’s 
results, at least in the propositional case. 
 
6.2.2. Definitions 
 
Let us turn to Rotschild’s definitions in the propositional case (we discuss a 
slightly simplified version of his system). In what follows, * is a classical 
connective, e.g. and, or, etc. We start with the formulas from which the dynamic 
lexical entry of a classical connective * will be defined.  Instead of Heim’s 
operations of set-theoretic intersection (A$B), union (A'B) and subtraction 
(A*B), we use Weak Kleene conjunction, disjunction, and a special operation 
which we write as notC , which is the propositional equivalent of 
complementation within C. 
(40) Syntax: definitions for C[X * Y]   
a. C is a definition 
b. If C’ is a definition, C’[X] and C’[Y] are definitions 
c. If C’ and C” are definitions, so are (C’ and C”), (C’ or C”), and notC C’10 
(if C is a tautology T, we write not C’ instead of notT C’) 
                                                
10 Rothschild uses not, which we replace with notC; the latter is intended to correspond to Heim’s 
operation C - F (= complementation within C). notC C’ can be taken as an abbreviation of (C and 
not C’), or its semantics can be defined directly, as is done below.  
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To illustrate: C, C[X], C[Y], C[Y][X] are definitions for C[X or Y].  
On the other hand, C[X or Y] itself is not a definition because (40) specifies that 
only the atomic elements X and Y can occur within [.].  By contrast, (C[X] or 
C[Y]) is a definition. C[notC X] is not a definition either, for the same reason, but 
not
C
 C[X] is one. 
 The semantics is trivalent. For atomic X, C’[X] is defined at a world w just 
in case in every world C’ entails X - which capture Heim’s definedness 
conditions. The rules for connectives are similar to Weak Kleene (slightly adapted 
for  notC). 
(41) Semantics 
We treat C as a bivalent atomic proposition and X and Y as trivalent atomic 
propositions. We write E for the value of an expression E. The semantics is 
intensional. For all w worlds w: 
a. C(w) = 1 iff w # C. 
b. C’[X](w) = #  unless C’(w) ! # and for all w’, if C’(w’) = 1,  X(w’) ! #. If 
! #, C’[X](w)  = 1 iff  C’(w) = 1 and X(w) = 1, = 0 otherwise. (Similar rule 
for Y). 
c. The  connectives are treated following the Weak Kleene logic, adapted to 
our special definition of negation: 
(C’ and C”)(w) = # iff C’(w) = # or C”(w) = #. (C’ and C”)(w) = 1 iff 
C’(w) = C”(w) =1 
(C’ or C”)(w) = # iff C’(w) = # or C”(w) = #. (C’ or C”)(w) = 1 iff C’(w) = 
1 or C”(w) =1 
(notC C’)(w) = # iff  C’(w) = #. (notC C’)(w) = 1 iff C(w) = 1 and C’(w) = 0 
 The next step is the definition of the dynamic extension u of a connective 
*. Basically, u is a propositional function which takes arguments C, X, Y, and 
returns a formula of this meta-language which gives the ‘right’ results in case  X 
and Y are bivalent (non-presuppositional): in such cases, u(C, X, Y) is required to 
be logically equivalent to (C and (X * Y)).  
(42) Extensions 
Let * a classical binary propositional connective. u is an extension of  * just 
in case for any (atomic) C, X, Y,  
(i) u(C, X, Y) is a definition for C[X * Y] 
(ii) if X and Y are bivalent,  |= (C and (X * Y)) ! u(C, X, Y).  
At this point, Rothschild’s system generates a variety of possible extensions for a 
given connective. For instance, and has the extensions u1, u2 and u3: 
                                                                                                                                
Note that, with the intended semantics, notC makes it possible to define Heim’s Context Change 
Potential for conditionals: 
C[(if X. Y)] = C and notC (X and notC Y) 
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(43) a. u1(C, X, Y) = C[X][Y] 
b. u2(C, X, Y) = C[Y][X] 
c. u3(C, X, Y) = (C[X] and C[Y]) 
At this point, then, the system overgenerates, as did Heim’s theory.  
 The last step is to make the system incremental; the incremental value ui 
of the extension u of a connective * yield undefinedness on ui(C, X, Y) if for 
some non-presuppositional Y’, u(C, X, Y’) = # (as was the case in the trivalent 
theories we considered above, it is crucial that Y’ only contain non-
presuppositional material). 
(44) Normal and Incremental values 
Let * a classical binary propositional connective, and let u be an extension of  
*. For any C, X, Y,  
the normal value of u is u itself; 
the incremental value ui of u for C[X * Y] is given by:   for all w, 
ui(C, X, Y)(w) = # just in case (i) for some non-presuppositional Y’, u(C, X, 
Y’) = #, or (ii)  u(C, X, Y)(w) = #. If ! #, ui(C, X, Y)(w) = u(C, X, Y)(w).  
To see this principle in action, consider again u1 and u2 defined in (43). It is clear 
that both are extensions of and, and that they may be undefined under different 
conditions: if Y is non-presuppositional and C[X] = #, u1(C, X, Y) = #, but  u2(C, 
X, Y), i.e. C[Y][X], may still be defined  (if C[Y] entails the presupposition of X). 
Still, the incremental values of u1 and u2 yield  the same result in the case at hand. 
It is clear that u1
i(C, X, Y) = u1(C, X, Y) = #. What about u2
i(C, X, Y)? Well, if Y’ 
is a tautology, we have u2(C, X, Y’) = C[Y’][X] = C[X] = #; so fo rsome non-
presuppositional Y’, u(C, X, Y’) = #, which means that the incremental value of u 
is undefined: ui(C, X, Y’) = #. 
 Rothschild 2008a shows that in the propositional case he derives precisely 
Heim’s results. The quantificational case remains to be studied, but it would seem 
that Rothschild’s analysis derives something very close to Heim’s universal 
inferences (as does LaCasse’s rather different reconstruction)(. 
 
6.2.3. Assessment 
Rothschild’s theory fully addresses the Explanatory Challenge while preserving 
all the intuitions of Heim’s analysis. It also inherits its empirical weaknesses, 
which are shared by the Transparency theory and our reconstruction of local 
contexts. It crucially borrows the incrementalization procedure adopted in the 
latter theories. But in the cases under study, incrementalization without a dynamic 
semantics  suffices to do all the work - which raises the question why a dynamic 
implementation should be necessary in the first place. 
 
7.  Symmetric Readings 
 
Since all the ‘new’ accounts start with a classical semantics, they derive the left-
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right asymmetries by a separate ‘incremental module’, which requires that certain 
principles be satisfied as soon as a trigger is encountered. But this immediately 
raises the possibility that these asymmetries might be the result of a simple bias - 
possibly due to processing - which can be overcome at some cost. So these 
theories are compatible with the view that presuppositions can be satisfied 
‘incrementally’, but also, with greater difficulty, ‘symmetrically’. In fact, 
Rothschild 2008a, b explicitly endorses symmetry, and makes it the core of his 
account; a similar position is adopted by Chemla in his own theoretical analysis of 
presuppositions (Chemla 2008b), and in Schlenker 2008a, b, to appear (by 
contrast, Beaver 2008 expresses complete skepticism). 
  There are well-known arguments in favor of a symmetric account of 
disjunction, illustrated in (45)a-b; but they extend to conditionals, as seen in 
(45)a’-b’:   
(45) a. There is no bathroom or the bathroom is well hidden (after Partee). 
b. The bathroom is well hidden or there is a no bathroom. 
a’. If there is a bathroom, the bathroom is well hidden. 
b’. If the bathroom is not hidden, there is no bathroom. 
(45)a-a’ are correctly predicted by dynamic semantics and the incremental version 
of the preceding accounts to carry no presupposition. By contrast,  they predict  
that (45)b-b’ should presuppose that there is a bathroom. The issue is complex 
and would require a longer discussion (see Schlenker to appear, a, b); but it is 
plausible that in these examples the presupposition of the first element is justified 
on the basis of information that appears at the end of the sentence. In fact, when 
the entire sentence is taken into account, (45)b becomes informationally 
indistinguishable from (45)a. And similarly for (45)b’ and (45)a’: trading on the 
near-equivalence between If not F, not G and if G, F, when the entire sentence is 
taken into account,  (45)b’ becomes informationally similar to (45)a’ - which 
makes it unsurprising that they should transmit presuppositions in the same way.  
 Although the implementation of symmetry raises some non-trivial issues 
(see Rothschild 2008b, Beaver 2008 and Schlenker 2008b for discussion), it 
makes predictions that ought to be tested. Let us consider a specific example. 
Theories that admit of symmetric readings predict that if not qq’, not p can 
(marginally) be understood with the presupposition if p, q  - i.e. with the 
incremental presupposition of if p, qq’.  In recent work conducted by Chemla and 
myself, we attempted to  test this prediction with experimental means. The 
question is subtle, because we only claim that presuppositions can marginally be 
satisfied by the symmetric algorithm; in other words, sentences whose 
presuppositions are symmetrically but not incrementally satisfied should have an 
intermediate status. In order to obtain acceptability judgments (as opposed to 
inferences), we explored the behavior of the presupposition trigger too in French 
(‘aussi’), which has the advantage of making accommodation - and in particular 
local accommodation - very difficult or impossible (see Beaver and Zeevat 2007 
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for discussion of why this might be so). This means that when the presupposition 
of aussi is not satisfied, the resulting sentence is deviant. We asked subjects to 
rate the acceptability of sentences such as those in (46)11 by way of magnitude 
estimation (for each sentence, they had to click on a bar whose extremes 
corresponded to ‘weird’ (0% acceptable) or ‘natural’ (100% acceptable)). 
(46) L'évolution du salaire des fonctionnaires va être remise à plat. 
The evolution of state employees’ salaries will be reconsidered. 
a1. Si les infirmières sont augmentées, les salaires des enseignants seront eux 
aussi  
{A. revalorisés  / B. bloqués}.  
If the nurses get a raise, the teachers’ salaries will THEM too be {A. 
increased / B. frozen}. 
a2. Si les infirmières sont augmentées, les salaires des enseignants seront {A. 
revalorisés / B. bloqués}. 
If the nurses get a raise, the teachers’ salaries will be {A. increased /B.  
frozen}. 
b1. Si les salaires des enseignants ne sont pas eux aussi {A. revalorisés / B. 
bloqués}, les infirmières ne seront pas augmentées.  
If the teachers’ salaries are not THEM too {A. increased / B. frozen}, the 
nurses won’t get a raise. 
b2. Si les salaires des enseignants ne sont pas {A. revalorisés / B.  bloqués}, 
les infirmières ne seront pas augmentées. 
If the teachers’ salaries are not {A. increased / B.  frozen}, the nurses won’t 
get a raise. 
(46)a1A displays the canonical order if p, qq’, where p entails q: the 
presupposition of the consequent is satisfied by the antecedent. (46)a1B should be 
deviant because the presupposition of the consequent is not entailed by the 
antecedent - in fact, it is contradictory with it. (46)a2 offers non-presuppositional 
controls. Finally,  (46)b1-b2 are like (46)a1-a2, except that if F, G is replaced with 
if not G, not F - which makes it possible to test the predictions of the symmetric 
analysis  We expected (46)a1A to be acceptable,  (46)a1B and (46)a2B to be 
unacceptable, and - crucially - (46)b1A to have an intermediate status. The results 
are represented in (47) (see Schlenker 200b for further details, and Chemla and 
Schlenker (in progress) for a full discussion). 
                                                
11 Aussi associates with focus, which can cause undesired ambiguities. To circumvent the 
problem, we inserted aussi right after a strong pronoun (e.g. eux aussi, literally ‘them too’), which 
yielded unambiguous sentences. 
PRESUPPOSITION PROJECTION: THE NEW DEBATE 687
(47) Acceptability judgments for the canonical and reversed orders in conditionals 
  
For conditionals, the results confirm the existence of a symmetric reading with an 
intermediate acceptability status; in a nutshell, the presence of a coherent trigger 
in the reversed order (= (46)a1B) yields an acceptability rating which is lower 
than the analogous case in the canonical order (= (46)a1A), but still much higher 
than the incoherent cases ((46)b1A and B). The experiment is still ongoing for a 
variety of other constructions, and additional triggers should be tested as well. 
Although the question should still be considered open, it can now be approached 
with experimental means. 
 
8. Open issues. 
 
8.1. The Proviso Problem 
 
For sentences of the form (p and qq’) or (if p, qq’), all the ‘new theories’ predict a 
conditional presupposition if p, q. But as was argued in detail in van der Sandt 
1992 and Geurts 1996, 1999, these predictions are often too weak, a difficulty that 
Geurts called the ‘Proviso Problem’ (see also Gazdar 1979, Karttunen and Peters 
1979). The greatest difficulty is to explain the contrast between (48)a, which 
displays the expected presupposition, and (48)b, which typically yields a stronger 
(unconditional) presupposition. 
(48) a. Peter knows that if the problem was easy / difficult, someone solved it. 
(Geurts 1999) 
!> Someone solved the problem. 
b. If the problem was easy / difficult, then it isn’t John who solved it. (Geurts 
1999) 
=> Someone solved the problem.  
There is now a growing body of work that attempts to explain on pragmatic 
grounds why conditional presuppositions are sometimes strengthened (see for 
instance Beaver 2001, Heim 2006, Perez Caballo 2007, and van Rooij 2007). 
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These solutions could be adapted to any of the new theories (Singh 2007 does 
explain it, but his account is in part syntactic). 
 
8.2. Restrictors 
 
Standard presupposition triggers that appear in relative clauses that restrict 
generalized quantifiers do not appear to yield universal inferences. This is to my a 
puzzle for all the theories we discussed (by contrast, DRT (van der Sandt 1992, 
Geurts 1999) and Beaver’s version of dynamic semantics (Beaver 1994) make 
better predictions here). To illustrate the problem, consider (49): 
(49) Among these 10 students... 
a. nobody who applied is aware that he is incompetent. 
=> each of the students who applied is incompetent. 
b. nobody who is aware that he is incompetent applied. 
!> each of the students is incompetent 
!> each of the students who applied is incompetent. 
No clear universal inference is obtained in (49)b, whereas one is in (49)a.  This 
pattern is confirmed when one considers the restrictor of other quantifiers, as is 
mentioned in Schlenker 2008a (Appendix B) and shown with experimental means 
in Chemla (to appear). 
 
8.3. Projection Patterns with Different Triggers 
 
Chemla’s data show that presupposition projection from the nuclear scope 
depends on the precise semantics of the quantifier - which is an argument in favor 
of trivalent approaches (or of Chemla’s own theory).  However the significance of 
these facts is mitigated by the observation, developed in Charlow 2008, that 
universal inferences are regained when ‘strong’ triggers are used (for present 
purposes, we can take strong triggers to be ones that resist local accommodation).  
Furthermore, Charlow’s findings extend to the restrictor position, where universal 
inferences can be regained too if the ‘right’ triggers are used. In both cases, he 
uses the trigger too associating with the verb smoke, in a context in which a 
salient alterantive is drink: 
(50) a. None/some/(more than) two of these 10 students [VP smoke(s)! too] 
=> Each of these 10 students drinks. 
b. Of these 10 students, (the) two who [VP smoke! too] are blonde 
=> Each of the 10 students drinks. 
These data should of course be explored further in future research. As far as I can 
tell, the complex interaction we observe between the nature of the trigger and the 
semantics of the quantifier is a puzzle for all existing theories. 
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8.4. Linear vs. Structural Incrementalism 
 
All theories under consideration have an ‘incremental’ component that posits that 
certain principles must be satisfied as soon as a trigger is processed, going from 
left to right. In the theories we discussed, this incremental component literally 
considered the words as they appear from left to right. But as was suggested 
independently by E. Stabler and D. Fox and  Ed Stabler, the algorithm should in 
the general case be applied to derivation trees rather than to strings. The simple 
language we have used in this discussion makes the two options equivalent, but 
only because it uses quite a few brackets to encode the derivational history of a 
sentence in the object language (see Fox 2008)12.   
 
8.5. Barker’s Problem 
 
Chris Barker (p.c.) has noted that the simplest version of the incremental system 
of the Transparency theory (or of the theory of local contexts) will make 
disastrous predictions in (51): 
(51) John awoke at 10am 
Let us assume that the predicate awoke at t presupposes had been sleeping up 
until t. Extended in the most natural way, the incremental theory would require in 
particular that for all modifiers M, for all predicative expressions d’,  
(52) C |= ((John (had slept and d')) M) ! (John d' M) 
But now replace M with at 8am, at 9am, at 10am, at 11am, at 12... Taking d’ to 
be a tautological predicate, we can ensure that the right-hand side is true - with the 
effect that C should entail that John had been sleeping up until 8am, at 9, at 10, at 
11, etc. - which is far too strong. The same problem arises in (53): 
(53) John has stopped beating his dog. 
The incremental theory (or rather a natural extension of it) predicts that for any 
Noun Phrase NP, 
(54) C |= (John ((used to beat and d') NP)) ! (John d' NP) 
By taking d’ to be a tautological transitive verb,  we will get an inference that 
John used to beat everything and everybody.  
                                                
12 An alternative direction is to adopt the trivalent compositional approaches of Peters 1979, 
Beaver and Krahmer 2001 and George 2007, 2008. In these, linear order only plays a role within 
the domain of the arguments of a functor. 
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 A natural solution would be to apply the incremental theory only at points 
at which a presupposition trigger has been fed all its arguments (including 
adverbial ones).  But the repercussions of such a move need to be carefully 
explored. 
 I conclude with a table summarizing in simplified form the predictions of 
the theories discussed here, as well as experimental or introspective data, with 
respect to three classes of phenomena: the existence of universal inferences, the 
availability of symmetric readings, and reaction times when presuppositions fail 
to be derived. 
 
 (Every P.RR’),  
(No P.RR’)  
(>5 P.RR’),  
(<5 P.RQ’)  
(=5 P.QQ’) (Q PP’ . R), 
with Q a 
quantifier 
Symmetric 
Readings 
Reaction  
times: 
cancellation  
Data (experiments): 
‘Standard’ triggers 
(Chemla) 
Universal  Non-
Universal 
Non-
Universal 
Non-
Universal 
Disputed costly 
Data 
(introspection):  
‘Strong’ triggers 
(Charlow) 
Universal Universal Universal Universal Disputed ? 
Dynamic  
Semantics 
Heim 1983 
Universal Universal Universal Universal No costly 
Transparency 
Theory 
Schlenker 2008 
Universal Almost 
Universal 
 
Almost 
Universal 
Almost 
Universal 
Yes, costly not costly 
Local Contexts 
Schlenker 
to appear 
Universal Almost 
Universal 
Almost 
Universal 
Almost 
Universal 
Yes, costly costly? 
Trivalence 
(differences between 
several versions)  
Universal, but 
not presup-
positional 
Non-
Universal 
Universal, 
but not 
presup-
positional 
Depends on 
the 
quantifier 
Yes, costly? costly? 
Constrained 
Dynamic  
Semantics 
Rothschild, LaCasse 
Universal Universal Universal Universal Yes 
(Rothschild)/ 
No (LaCasse) 
costly 
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